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D URING the past year there were several decisions of great importance,
and others which suggested significant questions yet to be settled. Though
there has been no legislative activity in this period, some bills of vital concern
to general family law will come before the legislature at the regular session
of 1973. If adopted, they will have a significant impact on matrimonial
property law.
I. CHARACTERIZATION
On several occasions the courts have stopped short of the issue of whether
an interest is separate or community property by limiting their determination
to whether it is even property for the particular purposes under discussion.
Nail v. Nail1 presented the question of whether the goodwill of the husband's
medical practice constituted property that is subject to valuation and partition
on divorce. The supreme court was pressed to find authority on which to
rely, but concluded, on the basis of decisions in other jurisdictions,' that the
goodwill of a professional practice is not a separate and distinct entity, and
so much "attaches to the person of the professional" that it is not "an earned
or vested property right ...subject to division" on divorce.' A related issue
was raised in a federal estate tax case.' The interest was a federal rice acreage
allotment; the issue was the includability of a moiety of its value in the
wife's estate for tax purposes. Though the Beaumont court of civil appeals
had treated a rice acreage allotment as an intangible interest, the value of which
was subject to consideration by a divorce court in making an equitable dis-
position of marital property,5 the federal court stressed the Beaumont court's
conclusion that a divorce court "had no authority to transfer a rice allotment."'
The federal court concluded that the rice allotment acquired during the mar-
riage of the decedent and her husband and continuing until her death did not
constitute a community property interest includable in the wife's estate since
she owned no interest in it as of the date of her death or, in the alternative,
if she did own an interest, it terminated at her death.
In Graham v. Franco,7 decided on the same day as Nail, the Supreme Court
of Texas also considered the issue of property vel non, but in a strikingly
different context.! In Graham the court examined the constitutionality of that
* B.A., University of Texas; B.A., B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972), iev'g 477 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1972), which had been cited with approval in Brooks v. Brooks, 480 S.W.2d 463 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1972).
2 E.g., Lilienthal v. Drucklieb, 84 F. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1898); Hunt v. Street, 182 Tenn.
167, 184 S.W.2d 553 (1945).
3486 S.W.2d at 763-64.4 Babb v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 792 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
5 Miguez v. Miguez, 453 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970), noted in
McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 41 (1971).
6 349 F. Supp. at 797 (emphasis added).
7488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).1 The case is among the first decided by the newly constituted Texas Supreme Court
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portion of the Matrimonial Property Act of 1967' in which the part of a
recovery for a spouse's persQnal injuries that is not measured by earning power
was defined as separate property. The court concluded that there is no conflict
between the constitutional definition of separate and community property and
that enunciated by the legislature in section 5.01 (a) (3) of the Family Code. °
In reaching this conclusion the court finally resolved a long and sometimes
acrimonious dispute which has raged in the legislature,1 before the bar, 2 and
among legal scholars."' The basic characterization question arises out of the
seemingly rigid constitutional definition 4 of separate property as only that
property acquired by spouses prior to marriage and that acquired during
marriage by gift or inheritance, with the added conclusion that all else acquired
during marriage is community property of the spouses. In construing this pro-
vision, enunciated in Castilian law and kept in force when the common law
of England was adopted generally as the rule of civil decisions in 1840," the
Texas Supreme Court considered whether the draftsmen of the constitution
regarded recoveries for physical and mental injuries, loss of reputation, and
like injuries as property, or as an independent interest vested in a particular
spouse as an element of personal security. The court concluded that the
draftsmen did not view such recoveries as property within the constitutional
definition. This conclusion is consistent with that reached as a secondary
proposition in two cases decided by the Texarkana court of civil appeals.'"
In one of these cases 7 the facts arose prior to the effective date of the 1967
Act, at which time statutory provisions attempting to make all of the wife's
personal injury recovery her separate property had been declared unconsti-
and is heralded in some circles as marking the beginning of a new era of the court. See
Matthews, New Leadership for the Court, 7 TRIAL LAWYERS F., Oct.-Dec. 1972, at 9.
9TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4615 (1968), reenacted in 1969 as TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01(a)(3) (Supp. 1972).
10TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01(a) (3) (Supp. 1972). The constitutional prob-
lem is analyzed by McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw.
L.J. 31, 33-37 (1972), on which the court relied. 488 S.W.2d at 394.
" In one early instance the legislature attempted to deal with an element of the problem.
See ch. 79, § 4, [1887] Tex. Laws 58, 59, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 856, 857
(1898). The legislature has twice attempted to deal with the matter generally: first, unsuc-
cessfully, in ch. 54, § 1, [19151 Tex. Laws 103, reenacted as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4615 (1925); and now, successfully, in ch. 309, § 1, [19671 Tex. Laws 736, codified
at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, 5 5.01(a) (3) (Supp. 1972).
"The court overruled contrary dictum in Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331 (1883), and
the progeny of that dictum in Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. High, 129 Tex. 219, 103
S.W.2d 735 (1937); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. White, 80 Tex. 202, 15 S.W. 808 (1891);
and Northern Tex. Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927),
error ref.
"See Green, The Community Property Defense in Personal Injury and Death Actions,
33 TEXAS L. REV. 88 (1954); Green, The Texas Death Act, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 461
(1948); Huie, Definition of the Vife's Separate Property, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 1054 (1957);
McKnight, Personal Injury as Separate Property-A Legislative History and Analysis of
the New Article 4615, 3 TRIAL LAWYERS F., Sept.-Oct. 1968, at 7; McSwain, The New
Marital Property Statutes, 2 FAMILY LAW NEWSLETTER No. 3 (1968), most of which were
cited with approval by the court. 488 S.W.2d at 394.
14 TEX. CONST. art. XVI, 5 15.
'"Act of Jan. 20, 1840, § 1, 3, [18401 Tex. Laws 3-4, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 177-78 (1898).
"Smith v. Smith & Rowe, 473 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971), error
ref. n.r.e., per curiam, on another ground, 478 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1972); Kirkpatrick v.
Hurst, 472 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971), rev'd on another ground, 484
S.W.2d 587 (Tex. 1972). Both are commented on in McKnight, supra note 10, at 36-37.
"Kirkpatrick v. Hurst, 472 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971).
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tutional because of overbreadth. The Texarkana court reasoned that the trial
court might submit an issue to the jury along the lines of section 5.01 (a) (3)
on the assumption that the doctrine it enunciated legislatively in 1967 had
been the law all along. The supreme court has since reached the same con-
clusion in a wrongful death case" in which the heirs of the decedent were
allowed to recover in spite of the contributory negligence of the surviving
spouse. The decision in Graham did not rest on the 1967 statute but on the
principle that the recovery for personal injury not measured by earning power
is simply of its nature separate rather than community property.
In Graham the court went on to deal with the problem of characterizing
the recovery for medical expenses. Acknowledging that there is room for dif-
ference of opinion on the point, the court concluded that "[t]o the extent that
the marital partnership has incurred medical or other expenses . .. [tlhe re-
covery ... is community in character."" Is the question therefore unresolved
with respect to separate obligations for medical and like expenses? The amount
of medical expense recovery is determined mainly by contractual or quasi-
contractual amounts billed (or to be billed) by a physician and a hospital.
In the absence of any contractual term that the individual or institution ren-
dering the service will look to the separate estate of a particular spouse for
payment, any debt that is contracted is a community debt and the obligation
for discharge of that debt falls on the community subject to the management
of the contracting spouse.' What the supreme court seems to suggest in
Graham is merely that the recovery for medical expenses based on a separate
or community loss is deemed, without proof to the contrary, to be a commu-
nity recovery. The court seemed to leave open a means of demonstrating a
separate recovery. After sustaining injury spouses will rarely have sufficient
wits about them to contract with physicians or hospitals for repayment of
services from the separate property of the injured spouse, and in most instances
the physician or institution would be unwilling to enter into such an arrange-
ment. But anticipating that one might at some future time be injured, one
could have a standing agreement with a physician or hospital to accept these
terms for payment for the injury of either spouse. If the spouse injured has
no separate property with which to make payment, such funds may be bor-
rowed on terms of separate repayment--or may be the subject of a gift of
community property or an advancement of community property subject to
reimbursement.
It has been established that insofar as a recovery for personal injury con-
stitutes community property, suit may be brought by the injured spouse since
the recovery is subject to his or her management."' In Jamail v. Thomas'
the husband, acting without authority of his injured, estranged wife, hired an
attorney on her behalf. Subsequently, the injured wife settled with her tort-
18 Schwing v. Bluebonnet Express, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1973).
" 488 S.W.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
5 8 Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937). Separate property liability,
as well as that of the community property subject to the management of the other spouse,
might also arise for the provision of a necessary.
"Few v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1971).
1'481 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1972).
19731
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
feasor's insurer without consulting the attorney. The attorney then instituted
an action against the husband alleging that he had filed suit in their behalf
for recovery "for their losses and physical pain, mental suffering, impairment
of the duties of a housewife and medical bills .... 2 The court denied re-
covery on the ground that the husband could not, in an employment agreement
with the attorney, assign a percentage of his wife's interest in her cause of
action arising from her injury. The wife had the sole right of management,
control, and disposition of the recovery including that for hospital and medi-
cal bills.4
Although the court did not so treat the question before it, another de-
termination as to whether an interest constituted property occurred in
Miser v. Miser." The issue was whether the husband's prospective, periodic,
retirement pay, an interest unvested at the date of divorce, was divisible by
the divorce court as a community property interest. The trial court concluded
(and was sustained on appeal) that division could be made on the basis of a
"when and if" order; i.e., when and if the interest should vest, the wife would
be entitled to a share of the proceeds, based on the proportionate part of the
benefits earned during the marriage. The decision seems to allow the divorce
court to exceed the proper exercise of its discretion. Within the holding in
Busby v. Busby"6 the unvested interest does not seem to be any interest at
all as of the date of divorce. Much of the difficulty in conceptualizing this
problem is related to Busby, and the court in Miser emphasized that in Busby
the Texas Supreme Court had relied on LeClert v.. LeClert,"7 a New Mexico
case in which the retirement rights had not vested at the date of divorce. If
the conclusion in Miser is conceptually sound, a divorce court might also
divide property against which a spouse has a claim of adverse possession as a
naked trespasser "when and if" that right ripens. But such a conclusion seems
manifestly unfair to a subsequent husband or wife of the acquiring spouse
if the right vests during a subsequent marriage. In Miser the vesting of the
right to retirement pay was anticipated to occur only about eighteen months
after the effective date of the divorce decree. But if the date of potential vest-
ing should occur many years hence, how can the divorce court properly exer-
cise its equitable discretion if it cannot know the facts at that time? The ulti-
mate difficulty may stem from the doctrine of inception of title and the cases
involving a question of characterization when property was acquired by ad-
verse possession."8 Apparently, in these cases no thought was given to the
2 1 Id. at 487.
24 The court relied on the analysis in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 132 (1968). See also Herrington v. Pelkey, 424 S.W.2d
507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968), error ref. n.r.e.; Miller v. Fitzpatrick, 418 S.W.2d
884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
1475 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), error dismissed.
21457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970). Related points are discussed in Badgett v. Erspan,
476 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972), and Comment, The Wife's Com-
munity Interest in Her Husband's Qualified Pension or Profit-Sharing Plan, 50 TEXAS L.
REv. 334 (1972).
9780 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969).
' This line of decisions is rooted in 19th century holdings related to acquisition of title
by sovereign-grant subject to a period of settlement. See, e.g., Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex.
265, 224 S.W.2d 471 (1949); Creamer v. Briscoe, 101 Tex. 490, 109 S.W. 911 (1908);
Mills v. Brown, 69 Tex. 244, 6 S.W. 612 (1887); Manchaca v. Field, 62 Tex. 135 (1884).
[Vol. 27
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notion of apportionment of the estate acquired between separate and com-
munity interests. 9 But since the doctrine of inception of title is given
mechanical application, it must be remembered that the doctrine is keyed to
the time of vesting. This approach affords no room for dealing with property
rights that may vest sometime in the future. Without considering the line of
cases on adverse possession, the Texas Supreme Court concluded in Busby
that the nature of retirement benefits is characterized at the date of vesting
of the benefits; their character is based on the marital status of the claimant
at that time. As has been pointed out elsewhere,"0 this can lead to unjust and
anomalous results and, curiously, equates the acquisition of the pension claim-
ant to that of the naked trespasser, rather than the trespasser with color of
title. But by any analysis, the projection of the rights of the spouse of the
claimant (whose rights are unvested) would seem to intrude on the ripening
of a presently non-vested right which at the date of the divorce decree is
simply nothing.
Though Busby may be said to be a disability-retirement case as opposed to
an ordinary retirement case, no particular point was made with respect to
disability other than that it was the cause of retirement. In Ramsey v., Ram-
sey," a divorce case before the Eastland court of civil appeals, the court
treated disability-retirement pay as separate property, considering it analogous
to a personal injury recovery. But even if disability is the occasion or imme-
diate cause of retirement, to show that all retirement pay is attributable to
that disability requires proof to rebut the presumption of community. In its
handling of another divorce case involving disability payments, the El Paso
court of civil appeals simply adverted to Busby, in spite of an argument based
on the federal supremacy doctrine." Except in Ramsey, no point has been
made of a precise and discernible difference between community and separate
interests in situations arising from ordinary retirement from military service
and retirement from military service based on disability. There is, however, a
difference in favor of the federal pensioner with respect to federal income tax
treatment of a portion of the payments when retirement is based on dis-
ability." But apart from that ground, it would seem difficult to make a show-
ing of a separate character.
A proper application of the inception-of-title doctrine is found in Parson
v. United States.4 There the decedent, while residing in a common-law state,
had acquired a number of life insurance policies before marriage and other
In applying the doctrine of inception of title to a situation of adverse possession, the tres-
passer with color of title acquires tide from the date of his possession, whereas the naked
trespasser acquires title only after the statute of limitations has run.
2"See, e.g., Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1851).
"0Note, Military Retirement Benefits as Community Property-Busby v. Busby, 25 Sw.
L.J. 340 (1971).
31474 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), error dismissed.
" Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972).
"3 No state appellate decision has pointed out the favorable federal income tax treatment
of a pensioner in a federal disability-retirement case. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, ss
104(a) (4), 105(d), 122; Treas. Reg. §S 1.122-1(b)-(d) (1970). See also the example of
computation in 1 CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 5 1197B.
'460 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'g in part 308 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Tex. 1970),
commented on in McKnight & Raggio, supra note 5, at 51-52.
1973]
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policies during marriage, but all were acquired before the decedent and his
wife established their domicile in Texas. The trial court held that the proceeds
of the policies should be includable in the decedent's gross estate in the pro-
portion that premiums paid from the decedent's separate property plus one-
half the premiums paid from community property bore to the total amount
of premiums paid. The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's equitable ap-
proach in favor of one based on the established doctrine of inception of title.
All the property acquired prior to establishing domicile in Texas retained its
ownership character at the time of acquisition, which in this instance was that
of separate property. The proceeds of the policies belonged to the separate
estate of the decedent at the time of his death and a right of reimbursement
belonged to the community for premiums paid with community funds. A case
involving correlative issues arose in a common-law state." Applying its con-
flict-of-laws rules, the Missouri court determined that Texas law would char-
acterize the nature of the personal property of a Texas spouse located on an
estate by the entirety in Missouri, and that under Texas law such property was
presumptively community property."
Another question was presented in Parson with regard to another life in-
surance policy. At the time of the purchase of that policy the decedent made
an irrevocable assignment of it to his wife as a gift. The court held that, with
respect to this policy, the wife was not only the beneficiary but also the owner
of the policy, so that no interest in it was includable in the decedent-husband's
gross estate."7 Another case raised similar problems." There the wife owned
all the incidents of ownership of policies on the life of her husband. The
couple was killed in a common disaster in which the wife predeceased the
husband. The Commissioner took the position that on the wife's death the hus-
band acquired the policies on his own life with the result that their value was
includable in his gross estate. The Tax Court concluded, however, that under
section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code,"9 the husband did not possess
incidents of ownership in the policies. At that point he merely had a right to
the remainder of his wife's estate and had neither ownership of the policies
nor substantive incidents of ownership.
Shades of Freedman v. United States' and Prichard v. United States4 ap-
peared in Bintliff v, United States,' in which the decedent had transferred all
incidents of ownership of life insurance policies on his own life to his wife as
'In re Perry, 480 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. 1972).
" The difference between the Texas community property doctrine and that of another
community property jurisdiction is discussed in a different context in Fernandez-Cerra v.
Commercial Ins. Co., 344 F. Supp. 314 (D.P.R. 1972). See also Fink v. United States,
454 F.2d 1387 (Ct. Cl. 1972), a revenue dispute involving Washington community prop-
erty law in a situation in which Texas community property law would have rendered the
same result. With respect to maintenance of a foreign residence for tax purposes, see Car-
penter v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 179 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
37 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042(2).
81Estate of Dawson, 57 T.C. 569 (1972).
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042.
40382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967), discussed in McKnight, supra note 24, at 133, and
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 48 (1969).
41 397 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1968), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 48-50 (1969).
4462 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 2 7
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her separate property,' so that the proceeds of the policies would not have
been includable in his gross taxable estate. The Fifth Circuit determined, how-
ever, that to the extent that the wife (joined by the husband) had assigned
part of the proceeds of the policy to discharge a community debt owed by the
husband, one-half of the amount so discharged would be includable in the
husband's gross estate.
Bintliff also sheds light on gifts in contemplation of death with respect to
premiums paid during the three years prior to the death of the decedent.
While the Government is incorrect in implying that life insurance is somehow
always inherently purchased in contemplation of death within the intent of
the Code provisions ... it is correct in asserting that there is a presumption
that all property transferred within three years of death for less than adequate
and full consideration is transferred in contemplation of death and, therefore,
includable in the decedent's gross estate. The burden is on the taxpayer to
show that the dominant motive for the gift was life-related."
Here premiums paid were deemed to have been made in contemplation of
death, as no life-related motive to their payment could be shown even though
the decedent did not in any sense contemplate death and was killed in an air
crash. It would be difficult to show that the payment of premiums on a life
insurance policy has a life-related motive, other than disposing of the care
and responsibility for the sums involved. But in First National Bank v. United
States" another panel of the Fifth Circuit seemed to suggest that a life-motive
might be more readily found in circumstances involving income producing
property, although in the particular circumstances of that case they were not.
The courts also considered a number of miscellaneous transactions between
spouses in characterizing particular property as separate or community. One
of the basic rules in construing transactions between husbands and wives is
that if the husband makes a conveyance of either separate or community prop-
erty to his wife, it is deemed to be a gift to her in the absence of fraud, acc-
dent, or mistake." The husband's purchase of property with separate property
and the taking of title in the name of the wife or in their joint names produces
a similar result. In Hampshire v. Hampshire 7 the husband bought land with
his separate property and took title in the name of himself and his wife. In
their divorce proceeding the wife testified that the husband had told her the
transfer was a gift, although the husband denied that he made the statement.
In the absence of any allegation of fraud, the presumption of gift to the wife
of a half interest in the land prevailed.48 The contention that a gift might be
made to the community, however, was once again rejected in another case."
A further argument with respect to gifts of property was raised in Wohlenherg
"With respect to this issue, the court relied on its decision in Parson. Id. at 406.
4Id.
-463 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1972).
"Dalton v. Pruett, 483 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972).
47485 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972).
"See Patterson v. Metzing, 424 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1967),
commented on in McKnight, supra note 41, at 48.
4'Higgins v. Higgins, 458 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970), noted in 23
BAYLOR L. REv. 303 (1971).
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v. Wohlenberg.5 The wife had opened a savings account in the names of both
spouses, and only community funds (the sources of which were unspecified)
were deposited. The husband had his name removed from the account, thus
leaving only the wife's name on the account. However, this act alone was in-
sufficient to rebut the presumption of community property."
With respect to dealings between husband and wife, the concept of reim-
bursement for advancements on dissolution of the community increasingly has
been seen as an unjust and out-dated concept in many instances. The measure
of reimbursement of a separate estate that contributed to improvement of the
community is the amount of investment or enhancement of value (whichever
is less) at the date of the dissolution of the community. (The correlative
doctrine for reimbursement of the community for separate enhancement is the
same.) Injustice lies in the fact that reimbursement does not include interest
from the date of advancement, so that in either an inflationary or deflationary
economic situation the estate which contributes to the enhancement of the
other stands to lose by passage of time. This loss is offset by any profits or
enjoyment which may flow to the advancing estate from the estate which has
been enhanced over the period of the life of the community. But as to the
ultimate takers of the advancing separate or community estate substantial loss
can result. One route of escape from this dilemma is to construe some trans-
actions between spouses as loans rather than advancements. At a time when
the husband was the manager of both separate estates as well as all the com-
munity, it was difficult (though not impossible)" to think in terms of loans
between husband and wife. But now that each has full contractual capacity,
such an approach is both easily arrived at and perfectly reasonable. In Padgett
v. Padgett" the question was whether the wife had lent money to her husband
or had simply allowed him to use her separate property by way of advance-
ment in the course of their marriage. She brought suit for her separate prop-
erty as the subject matter of a loan and claimed interest against her deceased
husband's estate from the time that the loan was made. The court pointed out
that if she had advanced money to her husband, interest would run only from
his death. But if she had made a loan (as the court concluded she had), inter-
est would run from the date of maturity of the indebtedness. Construing such
transactions as loans rather than advancements provides for interest and thus
disposes of most of the problems of inflation. The statute of limitation poses
a substantial barrier to this approach. Here the transaction occurred prior to
1968 when coverture tolled the statute of limitation with respect to claims of
married women," and the husband had also acknowledged the indebtedness
50485 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972).
" Also in issue was the unresolved question of the characterization of stock dividends on
stocks which were separate property. It was not proved that the particular shares in issue
were all declared on the separate stock and hence the presumption of community prevailed.
There is no holding by the Texas Supreme Court that stock dividends on separate stock are
separate property if declared from capitalized surplus and that conclusion would seem to
be contrary to principle. But see Tirado v. Tirado, 357 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1962), error dismissed. No point of error was taken on this issue, however.
52 See Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 90 S.W. 485 (1906); Ryan v. Ryan, 61 Tex. 473
(1884).
63487 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972).
' TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5535 (1925).
[Vol. 2 7
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in his will. The consequence of the reform of the statute of limitation (so
that coverture no longer tolls the running of time against a married woman's
claim)' is that married women must act to recover debts or achieve renewal
of them from their husbands before the statutory time bars their claims. But
when the debt is of the sort that would be barred by statute, the widow will
assert her right as one for reimbursement since advancements do not become
due until the community is dissolved, and at that time the statute of limitation
begins to run.' A wise married woman may lend her husband money without
fear of the consequences of her inaction if it is agreed that the loan does not
become due until actual demand is made or until the dissolution of the com-
munity. If in writing, such a note would still not be negotiable, but none the
less alienable."
In Dalton v. Pruett8 it was the widow who relied upon a statute of limita-
tion with respect to a conveyance made to her by her late husband. One issue
was whether recited consideration in the husband's deed to his wife could be
questioned. The court concluded, in effect, that the husband made a convey-
ance of his separate property to his wife. If the consideration paid was her
separate property, the property took the same character. If there were no con-
sideration, a gift to her separate estate could be presumed. But in any case
the husband's heirs were said to be barred from contesting the matter by the
four-year statute. The conclusion is dubious at best." Characterization is often
sought long after the facts governing the solution." For example, in a recent
instance" claimants to the estate of their deceased mother sought to set aside
a judgment alleged to have been rendered as a result of fraud fifty-two years
earlier. The Waco court of civil appeals held that the 1919 judgment did not
preclude the children from establishing the title of their mother.
The problems of commingling on dissolution of a community estate con-
tinually reoccur. In McKinley v. McKinle;' the problem was one of char-
acterizing assets of an estate as separate or community property of the de-
ceased husband. It was apparent that some of the funds might have been
accumulated prior to the marriage of the decedent and, hence, were asserted
to have been his separate property. But there was no way to distinguish that
which might have been acquired prior to marriage from that acquired during
marriage; therefore, the presumption of community of the whole prevailed.
In re Greer concerned a situation in which the husband attempted to show
by mathematical calculation rather than tracing that a substantial separate
estate which existed before the marriage still existed on dissolution. He showed
m Ch. 309, § 3, [1967) Tex. Laws 740 (codified at TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5535 (Supp. 1972)).
" Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964).
'
7TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §5 3.104, 3.109 (1968).
58 483 S.W.2d 926, 928-29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972).
"' The authority relied on, Fitchett v. Bustamente, 329 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1959), error ref. n.r.e., involved a purported gift to the wife attacked on the ground
of fraud.
60 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 410 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1966), error ref. n.r.e.
"'Crow v. Crow, 485 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972).
62483 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972).
11483 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972), error dismissed.
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the value of his antenuptial worth and the net amount of increase on divorce.
He asserted that the community would constitute the difference. Although this
arithmetical approach has been successfully employed in a federal estate tax
case," it is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of the community status in
Texas courts."
Transactions of spouses inter alios are subject to very different rules from
those of the spouses inter se. In Givens v. Girard Life Insurance Co." the
husband had designated a non-relative as beneficiary of his life insurance
policy. The premiums on the policy were paid by the husband's employer as
part of his compensation. Since the policy was, therefore, a community policy,
the naming of the beneficiary constituted a gift which under certain circum-
stances might be treated either as fraudulent, constructively fraudulent, or
effective. Justice Guittard, speaking for the court, reviewed the status of the
law in this area. He concluded that a gift to a relative would stand if adequate
provision is made for the surviving spouse out of other property. But if a gift
is made to an unrelated person, it is constructively fraudulent in the absence
of special justifying circumstances. The court held that as a matter of law
the surviving spouse should not have the burden of establishing fraudulent in-
tent in order to protect her community property interest from abuse of the
husband's managerial powers. Under such circumstances the wife is entitled
to her share of the community and the gift of the other half stands. The court
stressed its reliance on the Spanish writer Escriche6 ' in concluding that "ex-
cessive or capricious gifts would be void without regard to whether the hus-
band intended to defraud the wife" in such a situation."8 Though the legisla-
ture failed to pass the proposal of the draftsmen of the Matrimonial Prop-
erty Act of 1967 with reference to gifts of the community, the analysis offered
by the court in Givens goes a considerable distance toward achieving the re-
sults proposed."
II. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
A basic Texas rule on dividing property on divorce is that the division
shall be "just and right.""0 The question has been asked rhetorically whether
fault continues to be a proper criterion for division when a divorce is granted
on non-fault grounds." It has been suggested in another jurisdiction that fault
as such may cease to be a proper criterion for fixing division of property or
"Duncan v. United States, 247 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1957).
65See Tarver v. Tarver, 394 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1965); Kirtley v. Kirtley, 417 S.W.2d
847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967), error dismissed.66480 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972).6 7 DICCIONARIO DE LEGISLACI6N ANOTADO 71 (1840).
66 480 S.W.2d at 425. With respect to trusts set up by the manager of particular com-
munity, see Comment, How Much Control Is Too Much? Clarification and Limitation of the
Illusory Trust, 24 BAYLOR L. REv. 386 (1972). With respect to gift taxes attributable to
a surviving spouse when the surviving spouse shares in the community bounty of the de-
cedent, see Kaufman v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 23 (W.D. La. 1971), rev'd, 462 F.2d
439 (5th Cir. 1972).
"See McKnight, Matrimonial Property Law Reforms, 29 TEx. B.J. 1000, 1002, 1046
(1966).70 TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, 5 3.63 (Supp. 1972).
71 McKnight & Raggio, supra note 5, at 42-43.
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alimony if the dissolution of the marriage is not based on a finding of fault."'
But what of conduct of the spouses and other facts connected with the mar-
riage, which might be sufficient to support a finding of fault?"
The spouses are, of course,free to contract as they see fit with regard to
future provisions for support of each other.74 The terms of the court's "ap-
proval" of such contracts (except to trigger the effectiveness of the contract
by its own terms) are essentially beside the point." Since Francis v. Francis"
Texas courts have examined various aspects of the sufficiency of consideration
to support property settlement agreements on divorce." The subject was fur-
ther elucidated by the El Paso court of civil appeals." The court found con-
sideration for a binding agreement in the wife's acceptance of a division of
property as requested by the husband. A party cannot seek revision of such
an agreement following divorce without first offering to restore the benefits
received under it or making a sufficient explanation for failure to do so.7
The child support aspect of such settlements has been before the courts in
two recent cases that define the contractual and non-contractual elements. As
a matter of contract law the court cannot reduce the amount owed, but may
reduce the amount required to be paid below that specified in the agreement
for the consequences of contempt for disobedience." The Dallas court of civil
appeals concluded, however, that with respect to a property settlement agree-
ment that one parent was entitled to claim the children as dependents for
federal income tax purposes, the agreement cannot be subsequently altered."'
Though in many states the contractual support agreement is wholly merged
in the judgment, 2 in Texas the judgment may not affect the agreement. A pro-
vision in the property settlement agreement with respect to the payment of
taxes on the homestead might be fixed, whether or not attributable in part to
a provision for children. In the absence of agreement, the taxes fall on the
spouse to whom the home is awarded."
72 In re Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972); cf. Snyder, Divorce Michigan Style-
1972 and Beyond, 50 MICH. STATE B.J. 740, 743-44 (1971).
7' For observations on the new California statutes, see Goddard, A Report on California's
New Divorce Law: Progress and Problems, 6 FAM. L.Q. 405, 413-15 (1972); Comment,
The End of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in California Divorce Law, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
1306, 1316-17 (1970). See generally Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 COLO.
L. REv. 403, 410 (1971); Note, The No Fault Concept: Is This the Final Stage in the
Evolution of Divorce?, 47 NoTRE DAME LAW, 959, 972 (1972).
"'See, e.g., Shaw v. Shaw, 483 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972);
Sloan v. Sloan, 474 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971).
" Republic Nat'l Bank v. Beaird, 475 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971),
error ref.
78412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1967).7 See McKnight, supra note 10, at 31-32, in which recent literature and authorities are
collected and commented on.
7"Lampkin v. Lampkin, 480 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972).
" Guion v. Guion, 475 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
8 0Alford v. Alford, 487 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972); Myrick v.
Myrick. 478 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.) 1972), error dismissed.
An earlier dispute in Myrick is found in Ex parte Myrick, 474 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [Ist Dist.] 1971). See also Walley, Contractual Aspects of Child Support Agree-
ments, 36 TEX. B.J. 107 (1973).
"' Kolb v. Kolb, 479 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972).
"
2 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Commissioner, 455 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1972).




With respect to the court's ultimate power to divide separate and commu-
nity property on divorce, a clear interpretation of section 3.63" of the Family
Code has not yet been made. Thus, a constitutional issue that has never been
raised needs resolution. As section 3.63 now stands, it is a case of ancient
oversight compounded by recent oversight. In 1840 the Congress of the Re-
public adopted the common law of England as the rule of decision in Texas."
But in so doing the Congress excepted the law of matrimonial property from
the operation of the common law." In addition to the wife's paraphernalia (as
defined at common law), separate property was defined to include (1) all
land and slaves of either spouse acquired before marriage, and (2) all land
and slaves "as may be acquired by either party by gift, devise or descent"8 '
during marriage. The rest of the spouses' property was defined as the commu-
nity estate, which, therefore, comprised all significant personalty except slaves.
In the following year the Congress enacted Texas' first divorce statute." That
act provided that divorce courts may "order a division of the estate of the par-
ties ... as ... shall seem just and right" but that they should not "divest...
title to real estate or to slaves," the significant elements of separate property
as then defined."
The definition of separate property was altered in the Constitution of 1845
to its present form to include a/l property acquired before marriage and that
acquired during marriage by gift, devise, or descent.' Though the formulation
was then and still is in terms of the wife's separate property, the courts and
subsequent legislatures have defined the separate properties of the spouses in
the same terms."' But by oversight the statute with respect to the division of
property on divorce was left undisturbed and failed to exclude from the court's
power of division that ordinary personalty which had been redefined as sep-
arate property if acquired before or during marriage. The original divorce
statute of 1841 had forbidden division of all significant separate property, but
when the definition of separate and, hence, community property was changed
in 1845, the divorce statute was not made harmonious with the rest of the
scheme.
Until January 1, 1970, the statute defining the powers of the divorce court
to divide the property of the spouses retained the form of the prototype of
1841:" to order a division of the estate of the parties as the court deems just
and right without divestiture of title to realty. Until the supreme court finally
resolved the issue in 1960 by holding that only divestiture of separate realty
was forbidden, there was great difference of opinion whether community realty
"TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, S 3.63 (Supp. 1972).
Ch. 12, § 1, [1840] Tex. Laws 3-4, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 177-78 (1898).
"Ch. 12, § 4, [1840) Tex. Laws 4-5, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 178-79 (1898).
87Ch. 12, § 4, [1840) Tex. Laws 4, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 178 (1898).
"Act of Jan. 6, 1841, [1841] Tex. Laws 19-22, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
483-86 (1898).
9Id. § 4.
9"TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 19 (1845); TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1876); see
McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of Development and Reform, 8
CAL. WEST. L. REV. 117, 132-33 (1971).
"When the legislature again addressed the task of defining the community estate in
1848, it did so along the lines of the new constitutional definition of 1845. Ch. 79, §5
1-5, [18481 Tex. Laws 77-78, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAws OF TEXAS 77-78 (1898).
92 Ch. 130, § 1, [1921] Tex. Laws 251.
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was also covered by the ban. From an early time the supreme court had al-
lowed partial though not complete divestiture of title to separate realty."
When the issue was finally resolved, the supreme court limited the divestiture
proviso to separate real property, as the draftsmen of the statute of 1841
clearly had intended.
When section 3.63 was drafted and presented to the legislature in 1969, an-
other oversight occurred. The proviso against divestiture of realty had been
dropped out of the proposed revision, though the section was presented to the
legislature as unchanged.' The meaning of the section has twice been the
subject of comment by the courts," but without discussion of the legislative
history, and in neither instance did the court really purport to construe the sec-
tion conclusively. In Bryant v. Bryant the court said that "the similarity in the
wording of old Article 4638 . . . and the present Article 3.63 of the Family
Code... is sufficient to cause this rule of law to be the same.""' In DePuy v.
DePuy Chief Justice Nye, in a concurring opinion, said "generally, separate
property will be restored to its owner. Where personal property is involved,
the court is vested with the wide discretion in making disposition whether it be
separate or community.'"" No one has raised the constitutional issue: In the
light of the constitutional definition can the divorce court in dissolving a mar-
riage go beyond partition to change community property into separate property
or convert the separate property of one spouse into that of the other?
It has been long established that the fee for the wife's attorney in a divorce
proceeding may be a necessary. It has often been charged against the husband's
share of the community." This proposition dates back to a time when married
women lacked a general capacity to contract with attorneys or anyone else.1"
Since 1963, however, married women have had general contractual power."
No re-examination of the rule has been undertaken in the light of the wife's
contractual power or her proceeding on no-fault grounds when the husband
9 1 Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 331 S.W.2d 209 (1960); see Comment, Hailey,
Hilley and House Bill 670-A Study in Partition and Survivorship in Texas Community,
Property, 15 Sw. L.J. 613 (1961).
" Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443 (1855).
1 Title 1 of the Family Code was introduced early in the regular legislative session of
1969. An extensive hearing was had before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives on March 11 and a less extensive one before the Jurisprudence Committee of the
Senate on May 22. At neither of these was the section in issue discussed. The commentary
of the draftsmen distributed to the members of the committee was simple and concise with
respect to this provision: "This is a codification of present law." The bill was amended in
the house committee and on the senate floor but there was no discussion of this provision.
After the bill had been enacted by both houses, the senate sponsor asked that a thorough
review of the bill be made to see whether there were any flaws of sufficient moment to cause
him to ask the Governor to veto the bill. It was during this review that it was first noted
that the provisions of S 3.63 did not precisely track those of its predecessor, art. 4638. Ne-
vertheless, it was thought that these and some other flaws were not of sufficient magnitude
to cause the Governor to veto the bill, and so it became law. It was assumed that an amend-
ment could be offered at the anticipated special session so that this and other flaws might
be cured before the bill became law on Jan. 1, 1970. But no change has yet been made.
9"DePuy v. DePuy, 483 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972); Bryant
v. Bryant, 478 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972).
97478 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972).
98483 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972).
"Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 234 S.W.2d 1002 (1950).
109Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1964).
1O See, e.g., Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 474 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1971), error ref. n.r.e.
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is an unwilling or even innocent victim of marital dissolution. Apart from its
reiteration of the traditional view, the only striking aspect of Braswell v. Bras-
well' in this regard was the amount of the attorneys' fees awarded by the jury
-an amount based in part on the success of the wife's attorneys. In two other
cases the wife's attorneys initiated further proceedings for collection of their
fees. In one the wife's attorneys brought suit against both former spouses."'
The court held that the attorneys who participated in the trial and in reaching
the settlement agreement were bound by the court's decree that each party
should pay his or her attorneys, and the decree was res judicata of any claims
against the husband or the wife to recover attorneys' fees as necessaries. In
the other case"4 the wife's attorneys were intervenors in the suit for divorce
as parties and were awarded joint and several judgments against the wife and
husband for their fees which were fixed by the court. In a subsequent suit by
the attorneys against the husband for recovery of the fees, the court concluded
that the original judgment was res judicata and that the attorneys were not
entitled to a second judgment on the same debt.
In another instance,'4 the wife brought suit against the husband for her
attorneys' fees. The trial court had appointed a receiver to liquidate the com-
munity estate, to pay the costs of the proceeding and certain outstanding com-
munity debts, and then to divide the amount remaining between the former
spouses. Attorneys' fees were not fixed or awarded at the trial. After further
proceedings and the lapse of seven years, during which there was an appeal
and remand to the trial court on the issue of attorneys' fees, the trial court
ordered the husband to pay the wife's attorneys' fees. In the interval half the
proceeds from the sale of the community property had been disbursed to the
ex-wife without any payment of outstanding debts. During the same period,
the ex-husband had encountered many unforeseen expenses and financial
difficulties. Under these circumstances the appellate court held that the hus-
band should not be ordered to pay the wife's attorneys' fees as a matter of law.
In effect, the trial court had abused its discretion.
Though the practice is somewhat uncommon, third parties may be joined in
the proceedings for divorce in order to settle related property (and other) dis-
putes between them and one or both of the parties to the divorce. But as has
been recently demonstrated,'" the venue statutes may not make effective join-
der possible. In another case0"' an ex-husband brought suit against a third
person, and the plaintiff's ex-wife sought to intervene against both parties. The
plaintiff objected to being sued outside his county of residence. The court held,
however, that he had waived his objection to venue by initiating the principal
suit.
101476 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972), error dismissed.
103Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy & Collins v. Dawson, 478 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
104Carter v. Leiter, 476 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
l The California Supreme Court has recently held that if an attorney is discharged
without a fee, he is entitled only to the value of his services on quantum meruit. Fracasse
v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972).
100 Smith v. Horton, 485 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972), error dis-
missed.
'° Schulz v. Schulz, 478 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972).




Though the opinion in Coghlan v. Sullivan"9 is not altogether clear, the fol-
lowing facts seem to have given rise to the dispute. The husband and wife to-
gether operated a furniture store prior to the enactment of section 5.61 of the
Family Code, which provides that community property subject to the sole or
joint control of either spouse is liable for satisfaction of debts incurred by that
spouse. But, there does not seem to have been any question that the whole
estate of the couple was community and presumably wholly subject to the
husband's liabilities.11" ' Substantial debts were incurred by the husband in con-
nection with the business, and judgments were obtained against him by his
creditors. The couple was divorced in 1971, at which time they owned two
community automobiles. On divorce one car was awarded to each spouse. The
judgment creditors sought to levy execution on the husband's automobile. The
husband in turn sought to enjoin execution, asserting that both cars were ex-
empt: his under the family exemption statute . ' and hers under section 5.61 (b)
of the Family Code. The court concluded that the ex-husband's failure to assert
his right to designate property subject to levy"' constituted a waiver of that
right; therefore, the creditors might levy execution on his car. The court seems
to have assumed: (1) that the family exemptions were applicable in spite of
divorce; (2) that one of the cars was subject to the family exemption statute;
and (3) that the exempt car was the one in the wife's name. The court then
had to consider whether section 5.61 would provide any additional exemption
of property from the creditors' claims. The court held that it did not. (The
point might have been made more clearly, however, had the wife been attempt-
ing to defend against the levy of execution rather than the husband.) Assum-
ing the applicability of the personal property family exemption statute as the
court did, the result will not be the same in every normal marital situation. If
the wife's car were purchased with community funds subject to her sole man-
agement, which it was not under the facts in Coghlan, she could claim it as ex-
empt from her husband's creditors' claims."" Thereafter, the husband could
assert the family exemption for the community car subject to his sole manage-
ment." But on the facts given the court seems to have gone astray in assuming
the relevance of the family exemption statute. If no family existed with re-
spect to either spouse (and the facts given revealed none), both cars should
have been available to the creditors, as single persons are not entitled to claim
an automobile. For purposes of the family exemption statute,"" the term "car-
109480 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972).
"'Ch. 309, §§ 1, 6, [1967] Tex. Laws 736 (codified at TEx. FAM. COD3 ANN. tit. 1,
5 5.61 (Supp. 1972)).
"' See Moss v. Gibbs, 370 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1963) (liabilities incurred prior to Jan.
1, 1968); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 5.6 1(c), 5.22(b) (Supp. 1972) (liabilities
incurred between Jan. 1, 1968, and the time of divorce); and First Nat'l Bank v. Hickman,
89 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935), error ref. (liabilities incurred after the
divorce in 1971).
ln2ZEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3832 (1966).
..Id. art. 3859.
"4TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 5.6 1(c), 5.22(b) (Supp. 1972).
"' First Nat'l Bank v. Hickman, 89 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935), error
ref.
"1See Palmer & Olds, Exempt Property, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 23, 48 (J.
McKnight ed. 1963), and authorities cited therein.
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riage or buggy" includes a car, but for the single person the exemption for a
"horse" does not extend even to a bicycle or a motorcycle."7 Quite apart from
the need for updating the types of vehicles mentioned in the statute, the dis-
parity of treatment between married and single persons seems long overdue
for correction."'
Sections 5.61 (b) (1) and (2) and its predecessors have been relied on in
a long line of federal district court cases"' to protect community property
subject to the management of one spouse from tax liability incurred by the
other. But after the Ninth Circuit's decisions in United States v. Overman2 '
and In re Ackerman,"' and the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in United States v., Mitchell,2' it was apparent that the argument that these
Texas statutes created something other than state exemptions could not stand
for long. The anticipated ruling from the Fifth Circuit came in Broday v.
United States,' in which a husband sought to resist collection of his wife's
antenuptial income tax liability from community property subject to his man-
agement. The Revenue Service prevailed.'TM
In 1970 the Dallas court of civil appeals refused to relieve an ex-husband
of his obligation to pay contractual alimony.' He then sought relief through
a petition in bankruptcy." The bankruptcy court refused to grant a discharge
of the indebtedness as the court apparently felt that it was nondischargeable
because it was "for maintenance or support of wife.""2 7 That phrase clearly
describes the situation, but in Texas an enforceable obligation of this kind
only exists as part of a property settlement agreement---or, at any rate, a con-
tractual liability not grounded in the support obligation. The court may look
behind the agreement to determine whether it constitutes a compromise of
support owed or a purchase of property rights."' Under Texas law it could
only be the latter and should, therefore, be dischargeable.
"
7 Id. at 49.
" See McKnight, Modernization of Texas Debtor-Exemption Statutes Short of Constitu-
tional Reform, 35 TEX. B.J. 1137, 1141 (1972). Constitutional reform was achieved with
respect to the real property exemption law in late 1972 by adoption of two amendments to
TEX. CONST. art. VIII by which counties and cities are authorized to give tax relief to vet-
erans and the elderly with respect to their homesteads. See also Wikes v. Smith, 465 F.2d
1142 (9th Cir. 1972), a case involving California law, in which the wife unsuccessfully
asserted exempt status of an automobile purchased with money given to her by her husband
which was subject to creditors' claims.
."See McKnight, supra note 10, at 42 n.91; McKnight, supra note 24, at 144 & nn.84 ,
85; McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 39, 49
& nn.55-58 (1967).
120424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
11424 F.2d 1148 (9th Cit. 1970).
12403 U.S. 190 (1971).
123455 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1972).
" It is worth noting, however, that in United States v. Hershberger, 338 F. Supp. 804
(D. Kan. 1972), the court applied what might be described as the double-edged blade of
Overman to allow the state homestead exemption to shield the wife's interest in the home
and thereby protect it from levy for the husband's federal tax liabilities.
'Smith v. Smith, 460 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970).
121 In re Smith, No. BK-3-2065 (N.D. Tex., Nov. 20, 1972).
" Bankruptcy Act § 17(a) (7), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (7) (1970). The full language of
the Act is "for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or
child, or for seduction of an unmarried female or for breach of promise of marriage accom-
panied by seduction, or for criminal conversation."
128 Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1956); In re Avery, 114 F.2d 768 (6th
Cit. 1940); Fernandes v. Pitta, 47 Cal. App. 2d 248, 117 P.2d 728 (1941); Tropp v. Tropp,
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One would not ordinarily encounter argument to the proposition that a
conveyance of exempt property, regardless of the intent of the grantor, cannot
be the subject of a conveyance in fraud of creditors, because creditors are pre-
cluded from reaching the property anyway. That argument was made recently
in a rather unusual context.' In the property settlement agreement the wife
had conveyed the property to the husband with the proviso that it would be
reconveyed to her upon request. The ex-husband resisted compliance with the
terms of the agreement on the ground that she had transferred it to him while
they were married as part of a scheme to defraud her creditors. The husband's
position was apparently that the property had never been a homestead or had
lost its homestead character, though prior to the divorce the family had lived
in the home and the wife and children continued to live there after the divorce.
It is hardly surprising that the husband's contention failed. Transfers of other
types of exempt property are likewise protected from the assertion of creditors'
claims, though the transferor may have been insolvent and did not receive
value in the transfer. The Fort Worth court of civil appeals could have rested
its decision in Parker Square State Bank v. Huttash"'3 on this proposition. In
that case a creditor of a deceased, insolvent husband brought suit against his
widow to subject the proceeds of insurance policies on the decedent's life to
the payment of debts incurred by the decedent. Though the policies were
taken out long prior to the decedent's incurring the debt to his creditor (and
presumably while he was solvent), the creditor argued that the gift was not
complete until the death of the insured and that, therefore, the payment of the
proceeds to the widow constituted a voluntary transfer by an insolvent. The
court rejected this contention on the basis of earlier authority that the date of
the gift was the date on which the policy was purchased. 3 ' The court seems
to have overlooked another and more obvious ground for its conclusion, in
that the insurance policies had been in effect for more than two years and
were, therefore, exempt property under article 3832a... There does not seem
to have been any assertion that the premiums paid while the decedent was
insolvent constituted a source of recovery for the creditor.
The Texarkana court of civil appeals also had before it a case" involving
a purported fraudulent conveyance of a homestead. There a rural plot of 250
acres was purportedly conveyed by the husband and wife at a time when it
was apparent that the purpose was to defraud the husband's judgment creditor.
The court concluded that the creditor was indeed defrauded and held in favor
129 Cal. App. 62, 18 P.2d 385 (1933); McFarlane v. McFarlane, 298 Mich. 595, 299 N.W.
728 (1941); Wintrode v. Connors, 67 Ohio App. 106, 35 N.E.2d 1018 (1941); Holloway
v. Holloway, 69 Wash. 2d 243, 417 P.2d 961 (1966). But see In re Ridder, 79 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 721 (1936); Remondido v. Remondido, 41 Cal. App.
2d 208, 106 P.2d 437 (1940); Henson v. Henson, 366 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App. 1963);
D'Andria v. Hageman, 253 App. Div. 518, 2 N.Y.S.2d 832, aff'd, 278 N.Y. 630, 16 N.E.2d
294 (1938); Kadel v. Kadel, 21 Ohio Misc. 232, 250 N.E.2d 420 (1969). Both Ohio deci-
sions are somewhat idiosyncratic.
" Morris v. Morris, 482 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972).130484 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
.31 Mitchell v. Porter, 349 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961), error ref.
n.r.e.; cf. Davis v. Prudential Ins. Co., 331 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1964).
'3'TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3832a (1966).
"m Kyles v. Texarkana Prod. Credit Ass'n, 474 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1971), error ref. n.r.e.
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of the creditor, subject to the homestead right of the wife and children of the
deceased husband. Emphasis was placed on the fact that the wife had failed
to acknowledge the deed in the manner prescribed for homestead conveyance, 
1
3
but the court could have rested its conclusion on the proposition that insofar
as the property was exempt from creditors' claims it could not have been the
subject matter of a fraudulent conveyance.
In First National Bank v. McClung3 . the bank had lent additional money
against a homestead, on which the bank had a second lien, in order to pre-
vent foreclosure of the first lien. In rejecting the bank's claim of a further
lien, the court precluded it from stepping into the shoes of the first lienholder.
Though the bank could have done so simply by purchase of the note from
the first lienor, the independent advancement on the part of the bank would
not constitute an additional lien on the homestead.'
In another case'37 an attempt was made to fix a charge on homestead prop-
erty for arrears in child support payments. In the divorce the husband was
ordered to make child support payments and the wife was given occupancy of
the homestead until the youngest child reached the age of twenty-one. The
property was not dealt with otherwise. After the prescribed time had passed,
a creditor of the husband sought partition of what had been the community
homestead in order to reach the husband's interest. The divorced wife sought
to fix on the husband's share a charge for unpaid child support.' Her claim
was rejected, since the only remedy for recovery of delinquent child support
payments, as the law now stands, is contempt. If the wife is given the remedies
of a creditor in such a situation,"' by proper prior action she may be able to
fix a lien on the husband's share. But under the proposed statute no lien will
arise by operation of law, nor could it arise by prior order of the divorce court
in the event of delinquency.
The Tyler court of civil appeals has added its embellishment to the rule
that a mobile home is a homestead when established as a home on land in
which the owner maintains an interest." The purchaser sued for inherent
defects in the mobile home. The seller argued that if the home is a homestead,
the measure of damages is that applicable to realty rather than to personalty.
The court rejected this contention. The mere fact that the unit was intended
to be fixed to land does not alter the applicable measure of damages for de-
fects at purchase even though the defects are not discovered until the mobile
home is attached to realty.
'
34 See also Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1971).
1-483 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
.
88 See Davis, New Money for Old Homesteads, 35 TEx. B.J. 39 (1972).
'Miller v. Two Investors, Inc., 475 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), error
ref. n.r.e.
138 In the alternative, might she have asserted that the property was her homestead?
1See Smith, The Family Code (Cont'd), 35 TEx. B.J. 1120 (1972).
140Mobile Housing, Inc. v. Moss, 483 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972).
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